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Abstract
Delegating difficult computations to remote large computation facili-
ties, with appropriate security guarantees, is a possible solution for the
ever-growing needs of personal computing power. For delegated computa-
tion protocols to be usable in a larger context—or simply to securely run
two protocols in parallel— the security definitions need to be composable.
Here, we define composable security for delegated quantum computation.
We distinguish between protocols which provide only blindness—the com-
putation is hidden from the server— and those that are also verifiable—
the client can check that it has received the correct result. We show that
the composable security definition capturing both these notions can be re-
duced to a combination of several distinct “trace-distance-type” criteria—
which are, individually, non-composable security definitions.
Additionally, we study the security of some known delegated quantum
computation protocols, including Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi’s
Universal Blind Quantum Computation protocol. Even though these pro-
tocols were originally proposed with insufficient security criteria, they turn
out to still be secure given the stronger composable definitions.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
It is unknown in what form quantum computers will be built. One possibil-
ity is that large quantum servers may take a role similar to that occupied by
massive superclusters today. They would be available as important components
in large information processing clouds, remotely accessed by clients using their
home-based simple devices. The issue of the security and the privacy of the
computation is paramount in such a setting.
Childs [Chi05] proposed the first such delegated quantum computation (DQC)
protocol, which hides the computation from the server, i.e., the computation
is blind. This was followed by Arrighi and Salvail [AS06], who introduced
a notion of verifiability— checking that the server does what is expected—
but only for a restricted class of public functions. In recent years, this prob-
lem has gained a lot of interest, with many papers proposing new protocols,
e.g., [BFK09,ABE10,MDK10,DKL12,MF12,MF13,FK12,Mor12,SKM13,MK13,
GMMR13,CMK13,MPDF13,Mor14], and even small-scale experimental realiza-
tions [BKB+12,BFKW13].
However, with the exception of recent work by Broadbent, Gutoski and
Stebila [BGS13], none of the previous DQC papers consider the composability
of the protocol. They prove security by showing that the states held by the client
and server fulfill some local condition: the server’s state must not contain any
information about the input and the client’s final state must either be the correct
outcome or an error flag. Even though this means that the server cannot— from
the information leaked during a single execution of the protocol in an isolated
environment— learn the computation or produce a wrong output without being
detected, it does not guarantee any kind of security in any realistic setting. In
particular, if a server treats two requests simultaneously or if the delegated
computation is used as part of a larger protocol (such as the quantum coins of
Mosca and Stebila [MS10]), these works on DQC cannot be used to infer security.
A composable security framework must be used for a protocol to be secure in an
arbitrary environment. In the following, we use the expression local to denote
the non-composable security conditions previously used for DQC. This term is
chosen, because these criteria consider the state of a (local) subsystem, instead
of the global system as seen by a distinguisher in composable security.1
In fact, exactly these local properties have been proven to be insufficient to
define secure communication. There exist protocols which are shown to both
encrypt and authenticate messages by fulfilling local criteria equivalent to the
ones used in DQC— the scheme is secure if the eavesdropper obtains no in-
formation about the message from the ciphertext and authentic if the receiver
either gets the original message or an error flag. But if the eavesdropper learns
whether the message was transmitted faithfully or not, she learns some informa-
tion about this message [BN00,Kra01,MT10]. Since any secure communication
protocol can be seen as delegated computation for the identity operation—Eve
is required to apply the identity operation to the message, but may cheat and
try to learn or modify it— there is a strict gap between security of DQC and
1Standard terms for various forms of non-composable security, e.g., stand-alone or sequen-
tial, have precise definitions which do not apply to these security criteria.
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previously used local criteria.2
Composable frameworks have the further advantage that they require the
interaction between different entities to be modeled explicitly, and often make
hidden assumptions apparent. For example, it came as a surprise when Bar-
rett et al. [BCK13] showed that device independent quantum key distribution
(DIQKD) is insecure if untrusted devices (with internal memory) are used more
than once. It is however immediate when one models the security of DIQKD in a
composable framework, that existing security proofs make the assumption that
devices are used only once. Another example, the security definitions of zero-
knowledge protocols [Gol01] and coin expansion [HMQU06] make the assump-
tion that the dishonest party executes his protocol without interaction with
the environment.3 By explicitly modeling this restriction,4 these proofs can be
lifted to a composable framework. This has been used by, e.g., Unruh [Unr11],
who explicitly limits the number of parallel executions of a protocol to achieve
security in the bounded storage model.
Correctly defining the security of a cryptographic task is fundamental for
a protocol and proof to have any usefulness or even meaning. In this paper
we solve this problem for DQC, which has been open since the first version of
Childs’s work [Chi05] was made available in 2001.
1.2 Scope and security of DQC
A common feature of all DQC protocols is that the client, while not being
capable of full-blown quantum computation, has access to limited quantum-
enriched technology, which she needs to interact with the server. One of the
key points upon which the different DQC protocols vary, is the complexity and
the technical feasibility of the aforementioned quantum-enriched technology. In
particular, in the proposal of Childs [Chi05], the client has quantum memory,
and the capacity to perform local Pauli operations. The protocol of Arrighi
and Salvail [AS06] requires the client to have the ability to generate relatively
involved superpositions of multi-qubit states, and perform a family of multi-
qubit measurements. Aharonov, Ben-Or and Eban [ABE10], for the purposes of
studying quantum prover interactive proof systems, considered a DQC protocol
in which the client has a constant-sized quantum computer. The blind DQC
protocol proposed by Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi [BFK09] has arguably
the lowest requirements on the client. In particular, she does not need any
2An alternative example of this gap is as follows. The task is to compute a witness for
a positive instance of an NP problem, and we do so with the following protocol: the server
simply picks a witness at random and sends it to the client. Although the protocol does
not achieve completeness, it appears to be sound: the protocol obviously does not leak any
information about the input, since no information is sent from the client to the server. The
client can also verify that the solution received is correct, and never accepts a wrong answer.
But if the server ever learns whether the witness was accepted— e.g., it is composed with
another protocol which makes this information public—he learns something about the input.
If there are only two choices for the input with distinct witnesses, he learns exactly which one
was used.
3The security definitions for these two problems are instances of what is generally known
as stand-alone security [Gol04].
4This can be done by introducing a resource— e.g., a trusted third party— that runs
whatever circuits Alice and Bob give it in an isolated system, then returns the transcript of
the protocol to both players.
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quantum memory,5 and is only required to prepare single qubits in separable
states randomly chosen from a small finite set analogous to the BB84 states.6
Alternatively, Morimae and Fujii [MF13, Mor14] propose a DQC protocol in
which the client only needs to measure the qubits she receives from the server
to perform the computation.
A second important distinction between these protocols is in the types
of problems the protocol empowers the client to solve. Most protocols, e.g.,
[Chi05,ABE10,BFK09,FK12,MF13,Mor14], allow a client to perform universal
quantum computation, whereas in [AS06] the client is restricted to the evalua-
tion of random-verifiable7 functions.
Finally, an important characteristic of these protocols is the flavor of se-
curity guaranteed to the client. Here, one is predominantly interested in two
distinct features: privacy of computation (generally referred to as blindness)
and verifiability of computation. Blindness characterizes the degree to which
the computational input and output, and the computation itself, remain hidden
from the server. This is the main security concern of, e.g., [Chi05,BFK09,MF13].
Verifiability ensures that the client has means of confirming that the final output
of the computation is correct. In addition to blindness, some form of verifiabil-
ity is given by, e.g., [AS06,ABE10,FK12,Mor14]. These works do however not
concern themselves with the cryptographic soundness of their security notions.
In particular, none of them consider the issue of composability of DQC. A no-
table exception is the recent work of Broadbent, Gutoski and Stebila [BGS13],
who, independently from our work, prove that a variant of the DQC protocol
of Aharonov, Ben-Or and Eban [ABE10] provides composable security.8
1.3 Composable security
The first frameworks for defining composable security were proposed indepen-
dently by Canetti [Can01,Can13] and by Backes, Pfitzmann andWaidner [PW01,
BPW04,BPW07], who dubbed them Universally Composable (UC) security and
Reactive Simulatability, respectively. These security notions have been extended
to the quantum setting by Ben-Or and Mayers [BM04] and Unruh [Unr04,
Unr10].
More recently, Maurer and Renner proposed a new composable framework,
Abstract Cryptography (AC) [MR11]. Unlike its predecessors that use a bot-
tom-up approach to defining models of computation, algorithms, complexity,
efficiency, and then security of cryptographic schemes, the AC approach is top-
down and axiomatic, where lower abstraction levels inherit the definitions and
theorems (e.g., a composition theorem) from the higher level, but the definition
or concretization of low levels is not required for proving theorems at the higher
5This holds in the case of classical input and output. If quantum inputs and/or outputs
are considered, then the client has to be able to apply a quantum one-time pad to the input
state, and also decrypt a quantum one-time pad of the output state.
6The states needed by the protocol of [BFK09] are {(|0〉 + eikpi/4|1〉)/√2}k for k ∈
{0, . . . , 7}.
7Roughly speaking, a function f is random-verifiable if pairs of instances and solutions
(x, f(x)) can be generated efficiently, where x is sampled according to the uniform distribution
from the function’s domain.
8The work of Broadbent et al. [BGS13] is on one-time programs. Their result on the
composability of DQC is obtained by modifying their main one-time program protocol and
security proof so that it corresponds to a variant of the DQC protocol from [ABE10].
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levels. In particular, it is not hard-coded in the security notions of AC whether
the underlying computation model is classical or quantum, and this framework
can be used equally for both.
Even though these frameworks differ considerably in their approach, they all
share the common notion that composable security is defined by the distance
between the real world setting and an ideal setting in which the cryptographic
task is accomplished in some perfect way. We use AC in this work, because
it simplifies the security definitions by removing many notions which are not
necessary at that level of abstraction. But the same results could have been
proven using another framework, e.g., a quantum version of UC security [Unr10].
1.4 Results
In this paper, we define a composable framework for analyzing the security of del-
egated quantum computing, using the aforementioned AC framework [MR11].
We model DQC in a generic way, which is independent of the computing re-
quirements or universality of the protocol, and encompasses to the best of our
knowledge all previous work on DQC. We then define composable blindness
and composable verifiability in this framework. The security definitions are
thus applicable to any DQC protocol fitting in our model.
We study the relations between local security criteria used in previous works
[Chi05,AS06,ABE10,BFK09,MF13,FK12,Mor14] and composable security of
DQC. We show that by strengthening the existing notion of local-verifiability, we
can close the gap between these local criteria and composable security of DQC.
To do this we introduce the notion of independent local-verifiability. Intuitively,
this captures the idea that the acceptance probability of the client should not
depend on the input or computation performed, but rather only on the activities
of the (dishonest) server. Our main theorem is as follows.
Theorem 1.1. If a DQC protocol implementing a unitary9 transformation pro-
vides εbl-local-blindness and εind-independent εver-local-verifiability for all inputs
ψACAQ , where AC is classical and AQ is quantum, then it is δN
2-secure, where
δ = 4
√
2εver + 2εbl + 2εind and N = dimHAQ .
Note that by choosing the parameters such that δ is exponentially small in
the size of the quantum input (logN) negates the factor N2 blow-up in the
overall error (see also Remark 6.8).
Proving that a DQC protocol is secure then reduces to proving that these
local criteria are satisfied.10 For instance, the protocols of Fitzsimons and
Kashefi [FK12] and Morimae [Mor14] are shown to satisfy definitions of local-
correctness, local-blindness and local-verifiability, equivalent to the ones consid-
ered here. To prove that these protocols are secure, it only remains to show that
9Any quantum operation can be written as a unitary on a larger system, effectively allowing
this theorem to apply to all quantum operations, see Remark 6.5.
10This is similar in nature to the result on the composable security of quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) [PR14], which shows that a QKD protocol that satisfies definitions of
robustness, correctness and secrecy is secure in a composable sense. These individual no-
tions are all expressed with trace-distance-type criteria, e.g., a QKD protocol is ε-secret if
(1− pabort)‖ρKE − τK ⊗ ρE‖tr ≤ ε, where pabort is the probability of aborting, ρKE the joint
state of the final key and the eavesdropper’s system and τK is the fully mixed state. To prove
that a QKD protocol is secure, it is thus sufficient to prove that it satisfies these individual
notions.
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they also satisfy the stronger notion of independent local-verifiability introduced
in this work, which we sketch in Appendix C.
Finally, we analyze the security of two protocols— Broadbent, Fitzsimons
and Kashefi [BFK09] and Morimae and Fujii [MF13]— that do not provide any
form of verifiability, so the generic reduction cannot be used. Instead we directly
prove that both these protocols satisfy the definition of composable blindness,
without verifiability (in Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 on pages 34 and 35).
Interestingly—and somewhat unexpectedly—even though the local security
definitions used in previous works are insufficient to guarantee composable se-
curity, the previously proposed protocols studied in this work are all still secure
given the stronger security notions.
1.5 Other related work
The blind DQC protocol of [BFK09] has been getting considerable attention in
both the experimental and theoretical scientific community. Due to the rela-
tively modest requirements on the client, a small-scale experimental realization
of this protocol has already been demonstrated [BKB+12]. And even more
recently, an experimental demonstration of the protocol of [FK12]— which in-
cludes verifiability—has been performed as well [BFKW13].
Various theoretical modifications of this protocol have been proposed. For
instance, the settings where the client does only measurements [MF13,Mor14],
where the client uses weak coherent pulses [DKL12], or the server uses different
types of computational resource states [MDK10] have been studied. A DQC pro-
tocol for continuous-variable quantum computation has been proposed [Mor12],
as well as protocols in the circuit [GMMR13] and ancilla-driven [SKM13] quan-
tum computation models. To improve the efficiency of these protocols, fault
tolerant computation has been directly embedded in them [MF12,CMK13]. Al-
ternatives which minimize the communication complexity between the client
and server have also been studied [GMMR13,MPDF13]. Fisher et al. [FBS+14]
have investigated the related problem of quantum computation on encrypted
data, in which the computation is public and only the input-output are to be
kept secret.
Subsequent to this work, Morimae and Koshiba [MK13] gave a direct compos-
able security proof for the protocol from [Mor14]. They obtain tighter bounds on
the probability of failure than what one can obtain using the generic reduction
from local criteria proven in this work.
The prospects of delegated quantum computation with suitable security
properties go beyond the purpose of solving computational problems for clients.
In [ABE10,AV13] verifiable quantum computation has been linked to quantum
complexity theory, and to the fundamental problem of the feasibility of falsifying
quantum mechanics [Vaz07]. Reichardt et al. [RUV13] use an alternative model
of DQC with two non-communicating but entangled servers to achieve verifiable
quantum dynamics, and from this they also prove that QIP = MIP∗. The pri-
vacy properties of secure DQC have also been exploited in [MS10], where DQC
is suggested as a component of the verification step of unforgeable quantum
coins.
It is worth mentioning that the questions of secure delegated computation
have initially been addressed in the context of classical client-server scenarios.
Abadi, Feigenbaum and Killian [AFK87] considered the problem of “computing
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with encrypted data”, where for a function f , an instance x can be efficiently
encrypted into z = Ek(x) in such a way that the client can recover f(x) ef-
ficiently from k and f(z) computed by the server. There they showed that
no NP-hard function can be computed while maintaining information-theoretic
privacy, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses at the third level [AFK87].
A related, but distinct branch of research into the problem of securely dele-
gating difficult and time-consuming computations was also studied in the frame-
work of (computationally secure) public-key cryptography, essentially from its
very beginnings [RAD78]. Even in this setting, this problem known as fully ho-
momorphic encryption, was only solved recently [Gen09]. Though the goal of the
fully homomorphic encryption program was to achieve delegated computation
in which the communication between the server and the client is independent
from the size of the desired computation. In contrast, in all DQC proposals, the
communication is essentially proportional to the computation size; the client is
however limited to operations which are not sufficient for performing the desired
computation efficiently.11
1.6 Structure of this paper
In Section 2 we introduce the AC framework that we use to model security.
In Section 3 we then instantiate the abstract systems from Section 2 with the
appropriate quantum systems and metrics used in this work. In Section 4 we
explain delegated quantum computation, and model composable security for
such protocols. In Section 5 we show that composable verifiability (which en-
compasses blindness) is equivalent to the distance between the real protocol
and some ideal map that simultaneously provides both local-blindness and lo-
cal-verifiability. This map is however still more elaborate than local criteria
used in previous works. In Section 6 we break this map down into individual
notions of local-blindness and independent local-verifiability, and prove that
these are sufficient to achieve security. In Section 7 we prove that some existing
protocols are composably blind, in particular, that of Broadbent, Kashefi and
Fitzsimons [BFK09].
2 Abstract cryptography
2.1 Overview
To model security we use Maurer and Renner’s [MR11] Abstract Cryptography
(AC) framework (for a more detailed introduction to AC, we refer to [PR14]).
The traditional approach to defining security can be seen as bottom-up. One
first defines (at a low level) a computational model (e.g., a Turing machine or
a circuit). Based on this, the concept of an algorithm for the model and a
communication model (e.g., based on tapes) are defined. After this, notions of
complexity, efficiency, and finally the security of a cryptosystem can be defined.
The AC framework uses a top-down approach: in order to state definitions and
develop a theory, one starts from the other end, the highest possible level of
abstraction— the composition of abstract systems— and proceeds downwards,
introducing in each new lower level only the minimal necessary specializations.
11The client cannot perform the computation in polynomial time, assuming BQP 6= BPP.
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To clarify this point further, one may consider an example from mathemat-
ics, that of group theory and the specialized problem of matrix multiplication.
In the bottom-up approach, one would start explaining how matrices are mul-
tiplied, and then based on this find properties of the matrix multiplication. In
contrast to this, the AC approach would correspond to first defining the (ab-
stract) multiplication group and prove theorems already on this level. The
matrix multiplication would then be introduced as a special case of the mul-
tiplicative group, for which, naturally, all the theorems proven on the group-
theory level also hold.
On a high level of abstraction, a cryptographic protocol can be viewed as
(approximately) constructing some resource S out of other resources R. For
example, a one-time pad constructs a secure channel out of a secret key and an
authentic channel; a quantum key distribution protocol constructs an almost
perfect shared secret key out of a classical authentic channel and an insecure
quantum channel. If some protocol π uses a resource R to construct a resource
ε-close to S, we write
R
pi,ε−−→ S. (1)
For the construction to be composable, we need the following conditions fulfilled:
R
pi,ε−−→ S and S pi
′,ε′−−−→ T =⇒ R pi
′◦pi,ε+ε′−−−−−−→ T
R
pi,ε−−→ S and R′ pi
′,ε′−−−→ S′ =⇒ R‖R′ pi|pi
′,ε+ε′−−−−−−→ S‖S′
where R‖R′ is a parallel composition of resources, and π′ ◦ π and π|π′ are se-
quential and parallel composition of protocols, respectively.
In Section 2.3 we provide a security definition which satisfies these conditions.
Intuitively, the resource R along with the protocol π are part of the real or
concrete world, and the resource S is some ideal abstraction of the resource we
want to build. Eq. (1) is then satisfied if an adversary could, in an ideal world
where the ideal resource is available, achieve anything that she could achieve
in the real world. This argument involves, as a thought experiment, simulator
systems which transform the ideal resource into the real world system consisting
of the real resource and the protocol.
2.2 Resources, converters and distinguishers
In this section we define (on a high level of abstraction) the elements present in
Eq. (1), namely resources R, S, a protocol π, and a pseudo-metric allowing us
to define the failure measure ε.
Depending on what model of computing is instantiated at a lower level,
a resource can be modeled as a random system in the classical case [Mau02,
MPR07], or, if the underlying system is quantum, as a sequence of CPTP maps
with internal memory (e.g., quantum strategies [GW07] and combs [CDP09]).12
However, in order to define the security of a protocol, it is not necessary to go
down to this level of detail, a resource can be modeled in more abstract terms.13
A resource is an (abstract) system with interfaces specified by a set I (e.g.,
I = {A,B,E}). Each interface i ∈ I is accessible to a user i and provides her
12In Section 3 we define two-party protocols and quantum metrics on this level.
13In particular, on this level of abstraction it is not relevant whether the underlying system
is classical or quantum.
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or him with certain functionalities. Furthermore, a dishonest user might have
access to more functionalities than an honest one, and these should be clearly
marked as such (e.g., a filter covers these functionalities for an honest player, and
a dishonest user removes the filter to access them). We call these guaranteed and
filtered functionalities. For example, a key distribution resource is often modeled
as a resource which either produces a secret key or an error flag.14 This resource
has no guaranteed functionalities at Eve’s interface, but may provide her with
the filtered functionality of preventing a key being generated. Alice’s interface
guarantees that she gets a secret key (or an error flag), but it may also provide
her with the filtered functionality of choosing what key is generated.
A protocol π = {πi}i∈I is a set of converters πi, indexed by the set of
interfaces I. A converter is an (abstract) system with only two interfaces, an
outside interface and an inside interface. The outside interface is connected to
the outside world, it receives the inputs and produces the outputs. The inside
interface is connected to the resources used.
In Figure 1 we illustrate this by connecting a one-time pad protocol to
a resource R consisting of a secret key and an authentic channel. Let π =
(πA, πB, πE) be a one-time pad protocol, and πA be Alice’s part of the protocol:
πA is connected at the inner interface to a resource generating a secret key and
to an authentic channel (for this example, we assume that neither the ideal key
nor the authentic channel produce an error, they both always generate a key
and deliver the message, respectively), both of which we combine together as
the resource R. At the outer interface it receives some message x, it gets a key k
from the key resource, and sends x⊕ k down the authentic channel. Bob’s part
of the protocol πB receives y from the authentic channel and k from the key
resource at its inner interface, and outputs y ⊕ k at the outer interface. Note
that the protocol also specifies an honest behavior for Eve, πE , which consists in
not listening to the communication channel, i.e., it is a converter with no func-
tionalities at the outer interface and which blocks the leaks from the authentic
channel at the inner interface.
Converters connected to resources build new resources with the same inter-
face set, and we write either πiR or Rπi to denote the new resource with the
converter πi connected at the interface i.
15
Filters, which cover the cheating interface when a player is honest, can also
be modeled as converters.
To measure how close two resources are, we define a pseudo-metric on the
space of resources. We do this with the help of a distinguisher. For n-interface
resources a distinguisher D is a system with n + 1 interfaces, where n inter-
faces connect to the interfaces of a resource R and the other (outside) interface
outputs a bit. For a class of distinguishers D, the induced pseudo-metric, the
distinguishing advantage, is
d(R, S) := max
D∈D
Pr[DR = 1]− Pr[DS = 1],
where DR is the binary random variable corresponding to D connected to R.16
14This is the best one can achieve in certain settings, e.g., quantum key distribution, since
an adversary can cut the communication channels and prevent a key from being generated.
15There is no mathematical difference between piiR and Rpii. It sometimes simplifies the
notation to have the converters for some players written on the right of the resource and the
ones for other players on the left, instead of all on the same side, hence the two notations.
16In this work we study information-theoretic security, and therefore the only class of dis-
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Figure 1 – The concrete setting of the one-time pad with Eve’s honest protocol
πE . Alice has access to the left interface, Bob to the right interface and Eve to
the lower interface. The converters (πA, πB , πE) of the one-time pad protocol are
connected to the resource R consisting of a secret key and an authentic channel.
If d(R, S) ≤ ε, we say that the two resources are ε-close and sometimes write
R ≈ε S; or R = S if ε = 0.
2.3 Security
We now have introduced all the notions used in the generic security definition:17
Definition 2.1 (See [MR11]). Let Rφ = (R, φ) and Sψ = (S, ψ) be pairs of
a resource (R and S) with interfaces I and a filter (φ and ψ). We say that a
protocol π (securely) constructs Sψ out of Rφ within ε, and write Rφ
pi,ε−−→ Sψ, if
there exist converters σ = {σi}i∈I—which we call simulators— such that,
∀P ⊆ I, d(πPφPR, σI\PψPS) ≤ ε, (2)
where for x = {xi}i∈I , xP := {xi}i∈P .
We illustrate this definition in the case of the one-time pad. In this example,
we wish to construct a secure channel S, which is depicted in Figure 2 and de-
fined as follows (for simplicity, we assume that Alice and Bob are always honest,
and ignore their filtered functionalities): S takes a message x at the A-interface,
leaks the message length |x| at the E-interface, and outputs x at the B-interface.
This resource captures the desired notion of a secure channel, because it only
leaks the message size, and does not provide the adversary with any functional-
ity to falsify the message. We model explicitly that the message size leak at the
E-interface is not a guaranteed functionality by depicting it in gray in Figure 2.
We additionally draw the filter converter ψE , which covers the cheating inter-
face and can be removed by a dishonest player. ψE has no functionalities at the
outer interface, and blocks this message size leak at the inner interface. In the
general case, these filters can be defined for all interfaces.18
tinguishers that we consider is the set of all distinguishers.
17In [MR11] this definition is given on a higher level of abstraction. However for the partic-
ular case of filtered resources, Definition 2.1 is equivalent.
18We only denote Eve’s filter explicitly in the following, since Alice and Bob’s filters are
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Secure channel S
Alice Bob
ψE
x x
|x|
Eve
Figure 2 – A secure channel from Alice to Bob. Alice has access to the left
interface, Bob to the right interface and Eve to the lower interface. A filter ψE
covers Eve’s cheating functionality.
The correctness of the protocol π is captured by measuring the distance
between πR, the combination of the entire honest protocol with the resources
(Figure 1), and ψS, the ideal resource with all filtered functionalities obstructed
(Figure 2). In the case of the one-time pad, we have d(πAπBπER, ψES) = 0:
since the resources πAπBπER and ψES both simply take a message x as input at
the A-interface and output the same message at the B-interface, no distinguisher
can notice a difference.
If a player i cheats, she does not (necessarily) follow her protocol πi, but
can interact arbitrarily with her interface. We thus remove the corresponding
protocol converters from the real setting to model the resulting resource, which
we depict for the one-time pad in Figure 3a. Security of the protocol in the
presence of a cheating party i is achieved if this player is not able to accomplish
more than what is allowed by her interface of the ideal resource with the filter
removed. This is the case if there exists a simulator converter σi, independent
from the cheating strategy, that, when plugged into the i-interface of the ideal
resource S, can convert between the interaction with the corrupt player (or
distinguisher) and the filtered functionalities of the resource, such that the real
and ideal worlds are indistinguishable. For example, in the case of the one-time
pad and a dishonest Eve, a cipher y is leaked at the E-interface, whereas in the
ideal setting, only the message length is leaked. The simulator σE therefore must
recreate a cipher given the message length. It does this by simply generating
a random string y of the corresponding length and outputting it at its outer
interface. This is illustrated in Figure 3b. It is not hard to verify that with this
simulator, d(πAπBR, σES) = 0, since the resources πAπBR and σES both take
a message x at their A-interface, which they output at their B-interface, and
output a completely random string of the same length at their E-interface.
Definition 2.1 requires 2n inequalities to be satisfied in a model with n play-
ers, i.e., one for every possible subset of dishonest players. In practice however,
if we are only interested in modeling security when a given set of players is
known to always be honest—e.g., Alice and Bob are honest in the one-time pad
example— then it is sufficient to consider only the corresponding inequalities
from Eq. (2). This is equivalent to giving those players arbitrary filtered func-
tionalities, and reflects the fact that we do not place any restrictions on what
these players might achieve, were they to be dishonest.
trivial (the identity).
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y = x⊕ k
πA
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(a) The concrete resource resulting from honest Alice and Bob running their
one-time pad protocols (πA, πB) with a secret key and authentic channel.
Secure channel S
Alice Bob
σE
Random string
x x
|x|
Eve
y
(b) The ideal resource S constructed by the one-time pad for an honest Alice and
Bob, and a simulator σE plugged into Eve’s interface.
Figure 3 – The real and ideal settings for the one-time pad with a cheating
Eve. Alice has access to the left interface, Bob to the right interface and Eve to
the lower interface. Since these resources are indistinguishable, the one-time pad
provides perfect security.
Remark 2.2. Abstract cryptography (AC) differs from universal composability
(UC) [Can13,Unr10] in many conceptual and mathematical ways. In particular,
the AC requirement that there exist distinct simulators at each interface instead
of merging all dishonest players into one entity make it strictly more powerful
than UC: this allows dishonest players with restricted cooperation to be modeled
as a feature of the ideal resource, and thus directly capture notions such as
coercibility [MR11].
However, in the special case of one dishonest player, Eq. (2) is equivalent
to what one obtains by modeling the same problem with UC. Since the rest
of this work deals with delegated quantum computation, a two-party protocol
with one dishonest player, the same results could have been obtained using the
UC framework.
3 Quantum systems
In Section 2 resources and converters were introduced as abstract systems. Here
we model them explicitly for the special case of two-party protocols considered
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in the rest of the work. In Section 3.1 we first briefly define the notation and
some basic concepts that we use.19 In Section 3.2 we then model two-party
protocols. And finally in Section 3.3 we define several metrics which correspond
to the distinguishing advantage for specific resources.
3.1 Notation and basic concepts
H always denotes a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. We denote by L(HA,HB)
the set of linear operators from HA to HB, by L(H) the set of linear operators
from H to itself, and by P(H) the subset of positive semi-definite operators. We
define the set of normalized quantum states S(H) := {ρ ∈ P(H) : tr ρ = 1} and
the set of subnormalized quantum states S≤(H) := {ρ ∈ P(H) : tr ρ ≤ 1}. We
write HAB = HA ⊗ HB for a bipartite quantum system and ρAB ∈ S≤(HAB)
for a bipartite quantum state. ρA = trB(ρAB) and ρB = trA(ρAB) denote the
corresponding reduced density operators.
The set of feasible maps between two systems A and B is the set of all com-
pletely positive, trace-preserving (CPTP) maps E : L(HA) → L(HB). By the
Kraus representation, such a map can always be given by a set of linear operators
{Ek ∈ L(HA,HB)}k with
∑
k E
†
kEk = 1A. We then have E(ρ) =
∑
k EkρE
†
k.
We also consider trace non-increasing maps— in particular, to describe the evo-
lution of a system conditioned on a specific measurement outcome— i.e., maps
with operators Ek such that
∑
k E
†
kEk ≤ 1A. Though when unspecified, we
always mean trace-preserving maps. For a quantum state ρ ∈ S≤(HAC) and a
map E : L(HA)→ L(HB), E(ρ) is shorthand for (E ⊗ idC)(ρ), where idC is the
identity on system C.
Throughout this paper we mostly use the standard notation for common
quantum gates, for instance X and Z denote the Pauli-X and Pauli-Z op-
erators. We will additionally often refer to the the parametrized phase gate
Zθ = |0〉〈0| + eiθ|1〉〈1|, and the two-qubit controlled-Z gate ctrl-Z = |00〉〈00| +
|01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10| − |11〉〈11|.
3.2 Two-party protocols
A two-party protocol can in general be modeled by a sequence of CPTP maps
{Ei : L(HAC) → L(HAC)}i and {Fi : L(HCB) → L(HCB)}i, where A and
B are Alice and Bob’s registers, and C represents a communication channel.20
Initially Alice and Bob place their inputs in their registers, and the channel C
is in some fixed state |0〉. The players then apply successively their maps to
their respective registers and the channel. For example, in the first round Alice
applies E1 to the joint system AC, and sends C to Bob, who applies F1 to CB,
and returns C to Alice. Then she applies E2, etc.
In the AC terminology introduced in Section 2, the messages sent on the
channel C correspond to messages leaving a converter at the inner interface and
being sent through a channel resource R to the other player. The inputs are
initially received by the converters at the outer interfaces, and the final contents
19For a more detailed introduction to quantum information theory we refer to [NC00,Wat11].
20One could consider a more general two-party setting, where the players have access to
other resources than a channel, e.g., public randomness. But since in the rest of this work we
are interested only in protocols where the players have no other resource than a channel, we
also consider only this case here.
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of the A and B registers is output at the outer interface once the last map of
the protocol has been applied. This is illustrated in Figure 4.
E1
E2
...
EN
πA
Alice
F1
F2
...
FN
πB
Bob
...
R
ψA ψB
ρA ρB
Figure 4 – A generic two-party protocol. Alice has access to the left interface and
Bob to the right interface. The protocol (πA, πB) consists in sequences of maps.
The channel resource R simply transmits the messages between the players.
For a protocol with N rounds, the resource πiR, corresponding to one of the
players’ protocol plugged into the channel resource R, has been called a quan-
tum strategy by Gutoski and Watrous [GW07,Gut12] and a quantum N -comb
by Chiribella, D’Ariano and Perinotti [CDP09]. In particular, these authors de-
rived independently a concise representation of combs/strategies in terms of the
Choi-Jamio lkowski isomorphism. They also define the appropriate distance mea-
sure between two combs/strategies, corresponding to the optimal distinguishing
advantage, which we sketch in the next section.
3.3 Distance measures
The trace distance between two states ρ and σ is given by D(ρ, σ) = 12‖ρ −
σ‖tr, where ‖ · ‖tr denotes the trace norm and is defined as ‖A‖tr := tr
√
A†A.
If D(ρ, σ) ≤ ε, we say that the two states are ε-close and often write ρ ≈ε
σ. This corresponds to the distinguishing advantage between two resources R
and S, which take no input and produce ρ and σ, respectively, as output: the
probability of a distinguisher guessing correctly whether he holds R or S is
exactly 12 +
1
2D(ρ, σ). In Appendix A we define the generalized trace distance
and the purified distance, which are more appropriate for characterizing the
distance between subnormalized states.
Another common metric which corresponds to the distinguishing advantage
between resources of a certain type is the diamond norm. If the resources R
and S take an input ρ ∈ S(HA) and produce an output σ ∈ S(HB), the dis-
tinguishing advantage between these resources is the diamond distance between
the correspond maps E ,F : L(HA) → L(HB). A distinguisher can generate a
state ρAR, input the A part to the resource, and try to distinguish between the
resulting states E(ρAR) and F(ρAR). We have d(R, S) = ⋄(E ,F) = 12‖E − F‖⋄,
where
‖Φ‖⋄ := max{‖(Φ⊗ idR)(ρ)‖tr : ρ ∈ S(HAR)}
is the diamond norm. Note that the maximum of the diamond norm can always
be achieved for a system R with dimHR = dimHA. Here too, we sometimes
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write E ≈ε F if two maps are ε-close.
If the resources considered are halves of two player protocols, say πiR or
πjR, the above reasoning can be generalized for obtaining the distinguishing
advantage. The distinguisher can first generate an initial state ρ ∈ S(HAR)—
which for convenience we define as a map on no input ρ := D0()— and input
the A part of the state into the resource. It receives some output ρCR from
the resource, can apply some arbitrary map D1 : L(HCR) → L(HCR) to the
state, and input the C part of the new state in the resource. Let it repeat this
procedure with different maps Di until the end of the protocol, after which it
holds one of two states: ϕAR if it had access to πiR and ψAR if it had access to
πjR. The trace distance D(ϕAR, ψAR) defines the advantage the distinguisher
has of correctly guessing whether it was interacting with πiR or πjR, and by
maximizing this over all possible initial inputs ρAR = D0(), and all subsequent
maps {Di : L(HCR) → L(HCR)}i, the distinguishing advantage between these
resources becomes
d(πiR, πjR) = max{Di}i
D(ϕAR, ψAR). (3)
This has been studied by both Gutoski [Gut12] and Chiribella et al. [CDP09],
and we refer to their work for more details.
4 Delegated quantum computation
In the (two-party) delegated quantum computation (DQC) model, Alice asks a
server, Bob, to execute some quantum computation for her. Intuitively, Alice
plays the role of a client, and Bob the part of a computationally more power-
ful server. Alice has several security concerns. She wants the protocol to be
blind, that is, she wants the server to execute the quantum computation with-
out learning anything about the input other than what is unavoidable, e.g., an
upper bound on its size, and possibly whether the output is classical or quantum.
She may also want to know if the result sent to her by Bob is correct, which we
refer to as verifiability.
In Section 4.1 we model the ideal resource that a DQC protocol constructs
and the structure of a generic DQC protocol. And in Section 4.2 we apply the
generic AC security definition (Definition 2.1) to DQC.
4.1 DQC model
4.1.1 Ideal resource
To model the security (and correctness) of a delegated quantum computation
protocol, we need to model the ideal delegated computation resource S that we
wish to build. We start with an ideal resource that provides blindness, and
denote it Sblind.
The task Alice wants to be executed is provided as an input to the resource
S
blind at theA-interface. It could be modeled as having two parts, some quantum
state ψA1 and a classical description ΦA2 of some quantum operation that she
wants to apply to ψ, i.e., she wishes to compute Φ(ψ). This can alternatively
be seen as applying a universal computation U to the input ψA1 ⊗ |Φ〉〈Φ|A2 .
We adopt this view in the remainder of this paper, and model the resource as
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performing some fixed computation U on an input ψA that may be part quantum
and part classical.21
Any DQC protocol must reveal to the server an upper bound on the size
of the computation it is required to execute. Other information might also be
made intentionally available, such as whether the output of the computation
is classical or quantum. Although one could imagine a generic DQC model
in which these “permitted leaks” are entangled with the rest of the input, we
restrict our considerations to classical information, i.e., a subsystem of the input
ψA is classical
21 and contains a string ℓψA ∈ {0, 1}∗ that is copied and provided
to the server Bob at the start of the protocol, so that he may set up the required
resources and programs for the computation. Alternatively, this string can be
taken to be some fixed publicly available information, not modeled explicitly.
We do so in the following sections to simplify the notation, but prefer make it
explicit in this section so as not to hide the fact that some information about
the input is always given to the server.
The ideal resource Sblind thus takes this input ψA at its A-interface, and, if
Bob does not activate his filtered functionalities— which can be modeled by a
bit b, set to 0 by default, and which a simulator σB can flip to 1 to signify that
it is activating the cheating interface—Sblind outputs U(ψA). This ensures both
correctness and universality (in the case where U is a universal computation).
Alternatively, Sblind can be restricted to work for inputs corresponding to a cer-
tain class of computational problems, if we desire a construction only designed
for such a class.
If the cheating B-interface is activated, the ideal resource outputs a copy of
the string ℓψA at this interface. Bob also has another filtered functionality, one
which allows him to tamper with the final output. The most general operation he
could perform is to give Sblind a quantum state ψB—which could be entangled
with Alice’s input ψA—along with the description of some map E : L(HAB)→
L(HA), and ask it to output E(ψAB) at Alice’s interface. Since Sblind only
captures blindness, but says nothing about Bob’s ability to manipulate the final
output, we define it to perform this operation and output any E(ψAB) at Bob’s
request. This is depicted in Figure 5a with the filtered functionalities in gray.
Definition 4.1. The ideal DQC resource Sblind which provides both correctness
and blindness takes an input ψA at Alice’s interface, but no honest input at
Bob’s interface. Bob’s filtered interface has a control bit b, set by default to
0, which he can flip to activate the other filtered functionalities. The resource
Sblind then outputs the permitted leak ℓψA at Bob’s interface, and accepts two
further inputs, a state ψB and map description |E〉〈E|. If b = 0, it outputs
the correct result U(ψA) at Alice’s interface; otherwise it outputs Bob’s choice,
E(ψAB).
A DQC protocol is verifiable if it provides Alice with a mechanism to detect
a cheating Bob and output an error flag err instead of some incorrect com-
putation. This is modeled by weakening Bob’s filtered functionality: an ideal
21Alternatively, the input can be modeled as entirely quantum, and both Alice and the
ideal resource first measure the part of the input that should be classical, before executing
piA and the universal computation U , respectively. This corresponds to plugging an extra
measurement converter into the A-interfaces of both the real and ideal systems (that converts
the quantum input into a classical-quantum input), which can only decrease the distance
between the real and ideal systems, i.e., increase the security.
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Blind DQC resource Sblind
ρA =
{
U(ψA) if b = 0,
E(ψAB) if b = 1.
ψA
ρA
b
ℓψA
E , ψB
(a) Sblind provides blindness— it only
leaks the permitted information at
Bob’s interface — but allows Bob to
choose Alice’s output.
Secure DQC resource Sblindverif
ρA =
{
U(ψA) if c = 0,
|err〉〈err| if c = 1.
ψA
ρA
b
ℓψA
c
(b) Sblindverif provides both blindness and
verifiability — in addition to leaking
only the permitted information, it
never outputs an erroneous computa-
tion result.
Figure 5 – Ideal DQC resources. The client Alice has access to the left interface,
and the server Bob to the right interface. The double-lined input flips a bit set by
default to 0. The functionalities provided at Bob’s interface are grayed to signify
that they are accessible only to a cheating server. If Bob is honest, this interface
is obstructed by a filter, which we denote by ⊥B in the following.
DQC resource with verifiability, Sblindverif , only allows Bob to input one classical
bit c, which specifies whether the output should be U(ψA) or some error state
|err〉, which by construction is orthogonal to the space of valid outputs. The
ideal resource thus never outputs a wrong computation. This is illustrated in
Figure 5b.
Definition 4.2. The ideal DQC resource Sblindverif which provides correctness,
blindness and verifiability takes an input ψA at Alice’s interface, and two filtered
control bits b and c (set by default to 0). If b = 0, it simply outputs U(ψA) at
Alice’s interface. If b = 1, it outputs the permitted leak ℓψA at Bob’s interface,
then reads the bit c, and conditioned on its value, it either outputs U(ψA) or
|err〉 at Alice’s interface.
4.1.2 Concrete setting
In the concrete (or real) setting, the only resource that Alice and Bob need
is a (two-way) communication channel R. Alice’s protocol πA receives ψA as
an input on its outside interface. It then communicates through R with Bob’s
protocol πB, and produces some final output ρA. For the sake of generality we
assume that the operations performed by πA and πB, and the communication
between them, are all quantum. Of course, a protocol is only useful if Alice
has very few quantum operations to perform, and most of the communication
is classical. However, to model security, it is more convenient to consider the
most general case possible, so that it applies to all possible protocols.
As described in Section 3.2, their protocols can be modeled by a sequence of
CPTP maps {Ei : L(HAC)→ L(HAC)}Ni=1 and {Fi : L(HCB)→ L(HCB)}N−1i=1 .
We illustrate a run of such a protocol in Figure 6. This is a special case of
Figure 4 in which Bob has neither input nor output. The entire system consist-
ing of the protocol (πA, πB) and the channel R is a map which transforms ψA
into ρA. If both players played honestly and the protocol is correct, this should
result in ρA = U(ψA).
In the following, when we refer to a DQC protocol, we simply mean any pro-
tocol satisfying the model of Figure 6. Whether the protocol actually performs
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E1
E2
E3
...
EN
πA
F1
F2
...
FN−1
πB
...
R
ψA
ρA
Figure 6 – A generic run of a DQC protocol. Alice has access to the left interface
and Bob to the right interface. The entire system builds one CPTP operation
which maps ψA to ρA.
delegated quantum computation depends on whether it satisfies the correctness
condition, which we define in Section 4.2.
4.2 Security of DQC
Since we are interested in modeling a cheating server Bob, but do not care what
happens if the client Alice does not follow her protocol, it is sufficient to take
from Definition 2.1 the equations corresponding to an honest Alice. Applying
this to the DQC model from the previous section, we get that a protocol π
constructs a blind quantum computation resource Sblind from a communication
channel R within ε if there exists a simulator σB such that
πARπB ≈ε Sblind⊥B and πAR ≈ε SblindσB, (4)
where ⊥B is a filter which obstructs Bob’s cheating interface.22 The fist con-
dition in Eq. (4) captures the correctness of the protocol, and we say that a
protocol provides ε-correctness if this condition is fulfilled. The second condi-
tion, which we illustrate in Figure 7, measures the security. If it is fulfilled, we
have ε-blindness. If ε = 0 we say that we have perfect blindness.
Likewise in the case of verifiability, the ideal resource Sblindverif is constructed
by π from R if there exists a simulator σB such that,
πARπB ≈ε Sblindverif ⊥B and πAR ≈ε Sblindverif σB. (5)
The first condition from Eq. (5) is identical to the first condition of Eq. (4),
and captures ε-correctness. The second condition in Eq. (5) (also illustrated by
Figure 7) guarantees both blindness and verifiability, and if it is satisfied we say
that the we have ε-blind-verifiability.
Note that the exact metrics used to distinguish between the resources from
Eqs. (4) and (5) are defined in Section 3.3. πARπB and S⊥B — as can be
22From now on, we write all the converters plugged in the A-interfaces on the left of the
resources and those plugged in the B-interfaces on the right.
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≈ε
πA
ψA
ρA
R S
ψA
ρA
σB
Figure 7 – An illustration of the second terms of Eqs. (4) and (5). If a dis-
tinguisher cannot guess with advantage greater than ε whether it is interacting
with the real construct on the left or the ideal construct on the right, the two are
ε-close and the protocol ε-secure against a cheating Bob.
seen from their depictions in Figures 6 and 5 (with a filter blocking the cheat-
ing interface of the latter)— are resources which implement a single map, so
the diamond distance corresponds to the distinguishing advantage. πAR and
SσB are half of two-party protocols, so the distinguishing metric corresponds to
the distance between quantum strategies/combs introduced by Gutoski and Wa-
trous [GW07,Gut12] and Chiribella et al. [CDP09], and described in Section 3.3.
5 Blind and verifiable DQC
Finding a simulator to prove the security of a protocol can be challenging. In
this section we reduce the task of proving that a DQC protocol constructs the
ideal resource Sblindverif to proving that the map implemented by the protocol is
close to some ideal map that intuitively provides some form of local-blindness-
and-verifiability. The converse also holds: any protocol which constructs Sblindverif
must be close to this ideal map.
A malicious server Bob will not apply the CPTP maps assigned to him by
the protocol, but his own set of cheating maps {Fi : L(HCB) → L(HCB)}N−1i=1 .
Furthermore, he might hold (the B part of) a purification of Alice’s input,
ψABR. Intuitively, a protocol provides local-blindness
23 if the final state held
by Bob could have been generated by a local map on his system— say, F—
independently from Alice’s input, but which naturally depends on his behavior
given by the maps {Fi}i. It provides local-verifiability23 if the final state held
by Alice is either the correct outcome or some error flag. Combining the two
gives an ideal map of the from U ⊗Fok+ Eerr⊗Ferr, where Fok and Ferr break
F down in two maps which result in the correct outcome and an error flag,
respectively.
Definition 5.1 (local-blind-verifiability). We say that a DQC protocol provides
ε-local-blind-verifiability, if, for all adversarial behaviors {Fi}i, there exist two
completely positive, trace non-increasing maps FokB and FerrB , such that
PAB ≈ε UA ⊗FokB + EerrA ⊗FerrB , (6)
where PAB : L(HAB) → L(HAB) is the map corresponding to a protocol run
with Alice behaving honestly and Bob using his cheating operations {Fi}i, and
EerrA discards the A system and produces an error flag |err〉〈err| orthogonal to all
23We provide formal definitions of local-blindness and local-verifiability in Section 6.1.
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possible valid outputs. We say that the protocol provides ε-local-blind-verifia-
bility for a set of initial states B, if Eq. (6) holds when applied to these states,
i.e., for all ψABR ∈ B,
PAB(ψABR) ≈ε
(UA ⊗FokB + EerrA ⊗FerrB
)
(ψABR).
Remark 5.2. For simplicity, this definition assumes the allowed leaks (e.g., input
size, computation size) to be fixed, and applies to all protocols PAB tailored for
inputs with an identical leak (e.g., identical size). These leaks could be explicitly
modeled by allowing the maps FokB and FerrB to depend on them.
We now prove that it is both necessary and sufficient for a DQC protocol to
satisfy Definition 5.1 to be blind-verifiable, i.e., to satisfy the second condition of
Eq. (5). In order to construct Sblindverif , a DQC protocol also needs to be ε-correct,
that is, satisfy the first condition from Eq. (5). We show in Appendix B that
this is fulfilled, if, when Bob behaves honestly, Eq. (6) is satisfied for FokB = idB
and FerrB = 0.
Theorem 5.3. Any DQC protocol which provides ε-local-blind-verifiability is
2ε-blind-verifiable. And any DQC protocol which is ε-blind-verifiable provides
ε-local-blind-verifiability.
To show that local-blind-verifiability implies blind-verifiability we use a stan-
dard “dummy input” argument: the simulator runs Alice’s protocol with a
dummy input, and notifies the ideal resource to abort if the simulation aborts.
The converse is immediate after writing up the combined actions of the distin-
guisher and simulator as maps.
Proof. We start by showing that local-blind-verifiability is sufficient for a DQC
protocol to be blind-verifiable, i.e., there exists a simulator σB such that the two
resources in Figure 7 are 2ε-close. To do this, we define σB to work as follows. It
sets the bit b = 1, receives the permitted leaks ℓψA from Sblindverif , picks any input
ψB compatible with this information, and runs the protocol πA on this input
with its internal register, which we denote by B. After the last step, it projects
the state it holds in B on |err〉〈err| and I − |err〉〈err|, and sends c = 0 to Sblindverif
if no error was detected, otherwise it sends c = 1. As defined in Definition 4.2,
Sblindverif then either outputs the correct result or an error flag depending on the
value of c.
As described in Section 3.3, the most general operation the distinguisher can
perform to distinguish between the resources πAR and S
blind
verif σB, is to choose
some initial state ψAR, send ψA to the system with which it is interacting,
apply some operations {Fi : L(HCR) → L(HCR)}N−1i=1 each time it receives
some message on the channel C, and return each time the new state in C.
Let ρψAR be the final state when the distinguisher is interacting with πAR.
By Eq. (6),24 this state is ε-close to
τψAR :=
(U ⊗ Fok)(ψAR) + |err〉〈err| ⊗ Ferr(ψR),
for some Fok and Ferr which depend only on {Fi}i, not on ψAR.
24In the real system, Alice (holding A) runs the protocol with the distinguisher (holding R).
With these indices Eq. (6) reads PAR ≈ε UA ⊗FokR + EerrA ⊗ FerrR .
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When the distinguisher is interacting with SσB and using the same opera-
tions {Fi}i and initial state ψAR, let αψARB be the state of the system at the
end of the subroutine πA and before sending the bit c to S
blind
verif . Then, using
Eq. (6),25 we find that αψARB is ε-close to
γψARB :=
(
idA⊗Fok ⊗ U
)
(ψAR ⊗ ψB) + (idA⊗Ferr)(ψAR)⊗ |err〉〈err|.
The final operation performed by Sblindverif to generate the output can be seen
as a map S, which conditioned on B being an error, deletes B and overwrites A
with an error, and conditioned on B being a valid output, deletes B and applies
U to the system A. Since a map can only decrease the distance between two
states, the final state of the system after this operation, φψAR := S(αψARB), is ε-
close to S(γψARB) = τψAR. By the triangle inequality we thus have ρψAR ≈2ε φψAR.
We now prove the converse. If the protocol is ε-blind-verifiable, there exists
a simulator σB such that πAR ≈ε SσB. A distinguisher interacting with one
of the two systems chooses an initial state ψAR, and applies operations Fi :
L(HCR)→ L(HCR) to the messages received on the channel C and the system
R.
Consider now the interaction of the simulator and the distinguisher. Since
the simulator deletes its internal memory when it terminates, and outputs only
a single bit c notifying the ideal resource to output the correct result or an
error flag, the combined action of the two can be seen as a CPTP map F :
L(HR) → {0, 1} × L(HR). Conditioning on the output {0, 1}, we explicitly
define two trace non-increasing maps Fok,Ferr : L(HR)→ L(HR), i.e., F(ρ) =
|0〉〈0|⊗Fok(ρ)+|1〉〈1|⊗Ferr(ρ). Since the ideal blind and verifiable DQC resource
outputs the correct result upon receiving 0, and an error flag otherwise, the joint
map of ideal resource, simulator and distinguisher is given by U⊗Fok+Eerr⊗Ferr.
And this map must be ε-close to the real map, otherwise the distinguisher would
have an advantage greater than ε.
6 Reduction to local criteria
Although the notion of local-blind-verifiability defined in the previous section
captures the security of DQC in a single equation, it is still more elaborate than
existing definitions found in the literature, that treat blindness and verifiability
separately.
In Section 6.1 we provide separate definitions for these local notions, and
strengthen local-verifiability by requiring that the server Bob be able to infer
on his own whether the client Alice will reject his response— learning whether
Alice did reject will then not provide him with any information that he could
not obtain on his own. In Section 6.2 we show that in the case where Bob
does not hold a state entangled with the input (e.g., when the input is entirely
classical), these notions are sufficient to obtain local-blind-verifiability with a
similar error parameter. In the case where Bob’s system is entangled to Alice’s
input, we show that the same holds, albeit with an error increased by a factor(
dimHAQ
)2
, where AQ is the subsystem of Alice’s input which is quantum.
25In the ideal system, the simulator (holding B) runs the protocol with the distinguisher
(holding R). With these indices Eq. (6) reads PBR ≈ε UB ⊗FokR + EerrB ⊗ FerrR .
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This can be used to show that the protocol of Fitzsimons and Kashefi [FK12]
and Morimae [Mor14], which have already been analyzed using (insufficient)
local criteria, are secure. We provide a proof sketch of the missing steps for
both these protocols in Appendix C.
6.1 Local-blindness and independent local-verifiability
Local-blindness can be seen as a simplification of local-blind-verifiability, in
which we ignore Alice’s outcome and only check that Bob’s system could have
been generated locally, i.e., is independent from Alice’s input (and output).
Definition 6.1 (Local-blindness). A DQC protocol provides ε-local-blindness,
if, for all adversarial behaviors {Fi}i, there exists a CPTP map F : L(HB) →
L(HB) such that
trA ◦PAB ≈ε F ◦ trA, (7)
where ◦ is the composition of maps, trA the operator that trace out the A-system,
and PAB : L(HAB)→ L(HAB) is the map corresponding to a protocol run with
Alice behaving honestly and Bob using his cheating operations {Fi}i. We say
that the protocol provides ε-local-blindness for a set of initial states B, if Eq. (7)
holds when applied to these states, i.e., for all ψABR ∈ B,
trA ◦PAB(ψABR) ≈ε F ◦ trA(ψABR).
Likewise, local-verifiability can also be seen as a simplification of local-blind-
verifiability, in which we ignore Bob’s system and only check that Alice holds
either the correct outcome or an error flag |err〉, which by construction is orthog-
onal to any possible valid output. In the following we define local-verifiability
only for the case where Bob’s system is not entangled to Alice’s input, since oth-
erwise the correct outcome depends on Bob’s actions, and cannot be modeled
by describing Alice’s system alone.26
Definition 6.2 (Local-verifiability). A DQC protocol provides ε-local-verifia-
bility, if, for all adversarial behaviors {Fi}i and all initial states ψAR1 ⊗ ψR2B,
there exists a 0 ≤ pψ ≤ 1 such that
ρψAR1 ≈ε pψ(U ⊗ idR1)(ψAR1) + (1− pψ)|err〉〈err| ⊗ ψR1 , (8)
where ρψAR1 is the final state of Alice and the first part of the reference system.
We say that the protocol provides ε-local-verifiability for a set B of initial states
in product form, if Eq. (8) holds for all ψAR1 ⊗ ψR2B ∈ B.
As mentioned in Section 1, local-blindness and local-verifiability together do
not provide the security guarantees one expects from DQC. This seems to be
because the verification procedure can depend on the input (as in the example
from Footnote 2), and thus if Bob learns the result of this measurement, he
learns something about the input. This motivates us to define a stronger notion,
in which Bob can reconstruct on his own whether the output will be accepted—
the outcome of Alice’s verification procedure must thus be independent of her
26The resulting definition is equivalent to that of [FK12] and non-composable authentication
definitions [BCG+02], which bound the probability of projecting the outcome on the space of
invalid results.
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input. To do this, we introduce a new qubit in a system B¯, which contains a
copy of the information whether Alice accepts or rejects, i.e., for a final state
ρψARB = φ
ok
ARB + |err〉〈err| ⊗ φerrRB , (9)
we define
ρψ
ARBB¯
:= φokARB ⊗ |ok〉〈ok|+ |err〉〈err| ⊗ φerrRB ⊗ |err〉〈err|. (10)
Note that Eq. (10) can be generated from Eq. (9) by introducing a system B¯
in the state |ok〉 and changing its value to |err〉 conditioned on A being in the
state |err〉. Let QAB¯ : L(HA) → L(HAB¯) be such an operation, i.e., ρψARBB¯ =
QAB¯(ρψARB). Eq. (9) can then be recovered from Eq. (10) by tracing out the
system B¯.
The notion of verifiability is strengthened by additionally requiring that leak-
ing this system B¯ to the adversary does not provide him with more information
about the input, i.e., Bob could (using alternative maps) generate the system
B¯ on his own.
Definition 6.3. A DQC protocol provides ε¯-independent ε-local-verifiability,
if, in addition to providing ε-local-verifiability, for all adversarial behaviors
{Fi : L(HCB) → L(HCB)}i there exist alternative maps {F ′i : L(HCBB¯) →
L(HCBB¯)}i (for an initially empty system B¯), such that
trA ◦QAB¯ ◦ PAB ≈ε¯ trA ◦P ′ABB¯, (11)
where ◦ is the composition of maps, PAB : L(HAB) → L(HAB) and P ′ABB¯ :L(HAB)→ L(HABB¯) are the maps corresponding to runs of the protocol with
Alice being honest and Bob using maps {Fi}i and {F ′i}i respectively, and QAB¯ :
L(HA)→ L(HAB¯) is a map which generates from A a system B¯ holding a copy
of the information whether Alice accepts or rejects. We say that a protocol
provides ε¯-independent ε-local-verifiability for a set of initial states B, if the
same conditions hold for all states in B, i.e., if we have ε-local-verifiability for
B, and if for all ψABR ∈ B,
trA ◦QAB¯ ◦ PAB(ψABR) ≈ε¯ trA ◦P ′ABB¯(ψABR).
Remark 6.4. By the triangle inequality, if a protocol provides both ε-local-
blindness and ε¯-independent ε′-local-verifiability, then there exists a map F ′ :
L(HB)→ L(HBB¯) such that
trA ◦QAB¯ ◦ PAB ≈ε+ε¯ F ′ ◦ trA . (12)
6.2 Reduction
We first show in Lemma 6.6 that in the special case of initial states which are
not entangled between Alice and Bob’s systems (e.g., the input is classical),
local-blindess and independent local-verifiability are sufficient to achieve local-
blind-verifiability. In Theorem 6.7 we then generalize this to any initial state.
Remark 6.5. The two proofs in this section only hold for protocols that construct
a DQC resource for which the implemented operation U is unitary. Since any
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quantum operation can be written as a unitary on a larger system [NC00], this
effectively allows the theorems to apply to any CPTP operation E as long as the
necessary qubits for the unitary implementation are appended to the in- and
outputs. For example, instead of defining universal computation as a unitary,
most papers—e.g., [BFK09,FK12,MF13,Mor14]—describe how to perform any
(arbitrary) unitary operation Ux on any arbitrary input ρin. By appending the
description x of the unitary Ux to the input and output, this is equivalent to
applying the unitary transformation U :=∑x Ux⊗|x〉〈x| to the input ρin⊗|x〉〈x|.
Lemma 6.6. If a DQC protocol implementing a unitary transformation pro-
vides εbl-local-blindness and εind-independent εver-local-verifiability for any pure
initial state of the form ψAR1 ⊗ ψR2B, then the protocol provides δ-local-blind-
verifiability with δ = 2
√
2εver+ εbl+ εind for these initial states in product form.
Proof. In this proof, we use several times the following simple equality. For two
states ρ = |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ0 + |1〉〈1| ⊗ ρ1 and σ = |0〉〈0| ⊗ σ0 + |1〉〈1| ⊗ σ1, we have
D(ρ, σ) = D(ρ0, σ0) +D(ρ1, σ1). (13)
In Remark 6.4 we combined the conditions of local-blindness and the new
condition of independent local-verifiability into one new formula, Eq. (12). It is
thus sufficient to prove that if Eq. (12) and Eq. (8), are satisfied for any pure
product initial state ψAR1 ⊗ ψR2B , then we have local-blind-verifiability, i.e.,
ρψAR1R2B ≈δ
(U ⊗ idR1R2 ⊗Fok
)
(ψAR1 ⊗ ψR2B)
+ |err〉〈err| ⊗ ψR1 ⊗ (idR2 ⊗Ferr)(ψR2B), (14)
for some Fok and Ferr.
Since |err〉 is orthogonal to any valid output, both the RHS of Eq. (14) and
LHS (given in Eq. (9)) are a linear combination of orthogonal states on the same
subspaces. And thus by Eq. (13), to show that Eq. (14) holds for some δ, it is
sufficient to find maps Fok and Ferr, and δ1 and δ2 with δ1 + δ2 = δ, such that
φokAR1R2B ≈δ1
(U ⊗ idR1R2 ⊗Fok
)
(ψAR1 ⊗ ψR2B), (15)
φerrR2B ≈δ2 (idR2 ⊗Ferr)(ψR2B). (16)
Let F ′ : L(HB) → L(HBB¯) be the map guaranteed to exist by the combi-
nation of local-blindness and independent local-verifiability (Eq. (12)), and let
Pok
B¯
and Perr
B¯
be the maps corresponding to projections on the states |ok〉 and
|err〉 of the B¯ system. We define
FokB := trB¯ ◦PokB¯ ◦ F ′,
FerrB := trB¯ ◦PerrB¯ ◦ F ′.
Note that w.l.o.g., we can take F ′ to generate a linear combination of two
orthogonal states, one in the Pok
B¯
subspace and one in the Perr
B¯
. Thus, applying
Eq. (11) to the initial state ψAR1 ⊗ψR2B and using Eq. (13), we find that there
exist ε1 and ε2 with ε1 + ε2 = εind + εbl such that
φokR2B ≈ε1
(
idR2 ⊗FokB
)
(ψR2B), (17)
φerrR2B ≈ε2 (idR2 ⊗FerrB )(ψR2B). (18)
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Note that Eq. (18) is exactly one of the conditions we need to find, namely
Eq. (16). We now still need to bound Eq. (15).
We take the definition of local-verifiability, Eq. (8); again, both the RHS
and LHS (defined in Eq. (9)) are linear combinations of orthogonal states on
the same subspaces, hence there exist ε¯1 and ε¯2 with ε¯1 + ε¯2 = εver, such that
φokAR1 ≈ε¯1 pψ(U ⊗ idR1)(ψAR1), (19)
tr
(
φerrR2B
) ≈ε¯2 1− pψ. (20)
From Eq. (20) we have that tr(φokAR1 ) = 1 − tr(φerrR2B) ≈ε¯2 pψ. The general-
ized trace distance (see Appendix A) between the two states from Eq. (19) is
thus bounded by D¯
(
φokAR1 , p
ψU(ψAR1)
) ≤ ε¯1 + ε¯2 = εver. From Lemma A.1,
we can upper bound the purified distance with the generalized trace distance,
and get P
(
φokAR1 , p
ψU(ψAR1)
) ≤ √2εver. We can now apply Uhlmann’s theo-
rem to the purified distance (see Lemma A.2) and find that since U(ψAR1) is
a pure state, there exists a σR2B such that P
(
φokAR1R2B, p
ψU(ψAR1)⊗ σR2B
)
=
P
(
φokAR1 , p
ψU(ψAR1)
)
. Hence by Lemma A.1, Eq. (17), and the triangle inequal-
ity,
D
(
φokAR1R2B,U(ψAR1)⊗FokB (ψR2B)
)
≤ D(φokAR1R2B, pψU(ψAR1)⊗ σR2B
)
+D
(
pψU(ψAR1)⊗ σR2B,U(ψAR1)⊗FokB (ψR2B)
)
≤ √2εver +D
(
pψσR2B, φ
ok
R2B
)
+D
(
φokR2B,FokB (ψR2B)
)
≤ 2√2εver + ε1.
Combining this with our bound for Eq. (16), we prove the lemma.
We now generalize this lemma to initial states that may be entangled between
Alice and Bob. Since protocols can require part of Alice’s input to be classical,
we consider initial states of the form ψACAQBR, where the registerAC is classical,
AQ is quantum, and AQBR may be arbitrarily entangled. We reduce this case
to the separable state case treated in Lemma 6.6 with an increase of the error
by a factor of (dimHAQ)2.
Theorem 6.7. If a DQC protocol implementing a unitary transformation pro-
vides εbl-local-blindness and εind-independent εver-local-verifiability, then it pro-
vides δ-local-blind-verifiability with δ = N2(2
√
2εver + εbl + εind), for N =
dimHAQ , the dimension of the subsystem of Alice’s input which is quantum.
Proof. For any initial state ψABR = |x〉〈x|AC ⊗ ψAQBR and n := log dimHAQ ,
we define the state ψ′ATBRS := |x〉〈x|AC ⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|
⊗n
AQT
⊗ ψ′BRS , where |Φ+〉 =
(|00〉 + |11〉)/√2 is an EPR pair and ψ′BRS = ψBRAQ . For any map EAB :
L(HAB)→ L(HAB) we have
EAB(ψABR) = 22n trTS
(∣∣Φ+〉〈Φ+∣∣⊗n
TS
EAB(ψ′ATBRS)
∣∣Φ+〉〈Φ+∣∣⊗n
TS
)
.
The projection on |Φ+〉〈Φ+|⊗nTS can be seen as a teleportation of the system S
into AQ with a post-selection on the branch where no bit or phase corrections
are necessary.
26
Let QAB : L(HAB) → L(HAB) be the map corresponding to a run of the
protocol with Alice behaving honestly and Bob using his cheating strategy. Fur-
thermore, let F ′ : L(HB)→ L(HBB¯) be the map guaranteed to exist by the com-
bination of local-blindness and independent local-verifiability (Eq. (12)), and let
Pok
B¯
and Perr
B¯
be the maps corresponding to projections on the states |ok〉 and
|err〉 of the B¯ system. We define
FokB := trB¯ ◦PokB¯ ◦ F ′,
FerrB := trB¯ ◦PerrB¯ ◦ F ′,
RAB := U ⊗ FokB + EerrA ⊗FerrB ,
where U is the map implemented by the DQC protocol and EerrA deletes the
contents of A and outputs the error flag |err〉.
We then have,
D(QAB(ψABR),RAB(ψABR))
= 22nD
(
trTS
(∣∣Φ+〉〈Φ+∣∣⊗n
TS
QAB(ψ′ATBRS)
∣∣Φ+〉〈Φ+∣∣⊗n
TS
)
,
trTS
(∣∣Φ+〉〈Φ+∣∣⊗n
TS
RAB(ψ′ATBRS)
∣∣Φ+〉〈Φ+∣∣⊗n
TS
))
≤ 22nD(QAB(ψ′ATBRS),RAB(ψ′ATBRS)).
Note that the state ψ′ATBRS is in product form w.r.t. the systems AT and
BRS. This allows us to use Lemma 6.6, from which we get
D(QAB(ψ′ATBRS),RAB(ψ′ATBRS)) ≤ 2
√
2εver + εbl + εind.
By linearity this applies to any initial state ψACAQBR classical on AC .
Remark 6.8. If the input is entirely classical (e.g., the client wants to factor
a number), the failure ε is polynomial in the error parameters of the different
local criteria, and the reduction is tight. If the input is quantum, the failure is
multiplied by the dimension squared of the quantum (sub)system, and the errors
of the local criteria need to be exponentially small in the size of the quantum
input to compensate.
Corollary 6.9 (Theorem 1.1 restated). If a DQC protocol implementing a uni-
tary transformation provides εbl-local-blindness and εind-independent εver-local-
verifiability for all inputs ψACAQ , where AC is classical and AQ is quantum, then
it is δN2-blind-verifiable, where δ = 4
√
2εver + 2εbl + 2εind and N = dimHAQ .
If additionally it provides εcor-local-correctness,
27 it constructs Sblindverif from a
communication channel within ε = max{δN2, εcor}.
Proof. Immediate by combining Theorem 5.3, Theorem 6.7 and Lemma B.2.
7 Blindness without verifiability
We prove in this section that two different DQC protocols proposed in the
literature construct the ideal blind quantum computation resource Sblind given
27See Definition B.1 on page 38.
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in Definition 4.1. To show this, we need to prove that both conditions from
Eq. (4) are satisfied for ε = 0. In Appendix B we show that the intuitive notion
of local-correctness used in the literature is in fact composable, and thus the first
part of Eq. (4) is immediate from existing literature. In the following sections,
we prove that these protocols also provide perfect blindness. Note that they
do not provide verifiability, we therefore cannot use the generic results from
Section 6 to prove that they are blind.
We start in Section 7.1 with the DQC protocol of Broadbent, Fitzsimons and
Kashefi [BFK09], which we describe in detail in Section 7.1.1. In this protocol,
Alice hides the computation by encrypting it with a one-time pad. The core
idea used to construct the simulator can also be used to prove the security of the
one-time pad. In Section 7.1.2 we thus first sketch the security proof of the one-
time pad, and in Section 7.1.3 we prove that the DQC protocol of Broadbent,
Fitzsimons and Kashefi provides perfect blindness.
Morimae and Fujii [MF13] proposed a DQC protocol with one-way communi-
cation from Bob to Alice, in which Alice simply measures each qubit she receives,
one at a time. We show in Section 7.2 that the general class of protocols with
one-way communication is perfectly blind.
7.1 DQC protocol of Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi
7.1.1 The protocol
This protocol [BFK09] was originally called Universal Blind Quantum Compu-
tation (UBQC), and in the following we use this name. For an overview of
the UBQC protocol, we assume familiarity with measurement-based quantum
computing, for more details see [RB01,DKP07]. Suppose Alice has in mind a
unitary operator U that is implemented with a measurement pattern on a brick-
work state Gn×(m+1) (Figure 8) with measurements given as multiples of π/4 in
the (X,Y ) plane with overall computation size S = n× (m+1). Note that mea-
surement based quantum computation, where the measurements are restricted
in the sense above is approximately universal, so there are no restrictions im-
posed on U [BFK09].
This pattern could have been designed either directly in MBQC or generated
from a circuit construction. Each qubit in Gn×(m+1) is indexed by a column
y ∈ {0, . . . ,m} and row x ∈ {1, . . . , n} = [n]. Thus each qubit is assigned a
measurement angle φx,y, and two sets Dx,y, D
′
x,y ⊆ [n] × {0, . . . , y − 1} which
we call X-dependencies and Z-dependencies, respectively.
The dependency sets comprise subsets of the set of the two-coordinate indices.
They reflect the fact that in measurement-based quantum computation, to en-
sure a correct and deterministic computation, the measurement angles which
define the computation may have to be modified for each qubit depending on
some of the prior measurement outcomes. In particular, here we assume that the
dependency sets Dx,y and D
′
x,y are obtained via the flow construction [DK06].
During the execution of the computation, the adapted measurement angle
φ′x,y is computed from φx,y and the previous measurement outcomes in the fol-
lowing way: let sXx,y = ⊕i∈Dx,ysi be the parity of all measurement outcomes for
qubits in Dx,y and similarly, s
Z
x,y = ⊕i∈D′x,ysi be the parity of all measurement
outcomes for qubits in D′x,y (the index i here is a two coordinate index, an
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Figure 8 – The brickwork state, Gn×m, a universal resource state for
measurement-based quantum computing requiring only single qubit measurement
in the (X,Y ) plane [BFK09]. Qubits |ψx,y〉 (x = 1, . . . , n, y = 1, . . . ,m) are ar-
ranged according to layer x and row y, corresponding to the vertices in the above
graph, and are originally in the |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) state. Controlled-Z gates
are then performed between qubits which are joined by an edge. The rule deter-
mining which qubits are joined by an edge is as follows: 1) Neighboring qubits
of the same row are joined; 2) For each column j = 3 mod 8 and each odd row
i, the qubits at positions (i, j) and (i+ 1, j) and also on positions (i, j + 2) and
(i + 1, j + 2) are joined; 3) For each column j = 7 mod 8 and each even row
i, the qubits at positions (i, j) and (i+ 1, j) and also on positions (i, j + 2) and
(i + 1, j + 2) are joined. The quantum input is usually placed in the leftmost
column of the brickwork state, whereas the output is generated in the rightmost
column by sequential single qubit measurements. The qubits are usually mea-
sured from top to bottom per column, where the order of columns is from left to
right.
element of [n]× {0, . . . ,m}). Then,
φ′x,y = (−1)s
X
x,yφx,y + s
Z
x,yπ. (21)
This will be used in a protocol, where the first column of the brickwork state
is a one-time pad encryption of the input.28 The measurement angles of the first
two columns then have to be updated to compensate for (bit) flips ix performed
by the encryption, namely
φ′x,0 = (−1)ixφx,0 and φ′x,1 = φx,1 + ixπ. (22)
Protocol 1 implements a blind quantum computation for an input ψA =
ρin ⊗ |U〉〈U |.29 It was shown in [BFK09] that this protocol is correct, i.e., if
both Alice and Bob follow the steps of the protocol then the final output state
is ρout = UρinU
†.
28In UBQC with a quantum input, the input is initially encoded with a variant of the
quantum one-time pad by Alice, to preserve her privacy. The operators implementing the
one-time pad that Alice applies to the input may include an arbitrary rotation within the
XY plane of the Bloch sphere (a Zθ rotation), and a Pauli-X operator. Because of the
commutation relation (X ⊗ id)ctrl-Z = ctrl-Z(X ⊗ Z) between the Pauli-X operator and the
controlled Z entangling operation, this component of the one-time pad must be accounted for
in the measurement angles for the neighbors of the input layer, as in Eq. (22).
29The particular variant of the UBQC protocol we present assumes a quantum input and
a quantum output, however the protocol is easily modified to take classical inputs and/or
produces classical outputs, see [BFK09]. In the classical input case, the quantum input is
simply not sent, and the preparation of the classical input is assumed to be encoded in the
computation itself. For the classical output, the server would simply measure out the final
column of qubits as well, which produces a one-time padded version of the computation result.
The quantum input-output setting is more general than other variants, and the security of
29
Protocol 1 Universal Blind Quantum Computation
Alice’s input:
• An n−qubit unitary map U , represented as a sequence of measurement
angles {φx,y} of a one-way quantum computation over a brickwork state
of the size n×(m+1), along with the X and Z dependency sets Dx,y, D′x,y,
respectively.
• An n-qubit input state ρin
Alice’s output (for an honest Bob):
• The n−qubit quantum state ρout = UρinU †
The protocol
1. State preparation
1.1. For each x ∈ [n], Alice applies X ixZθx,0 to the xth qubit of the input
ρin, where the binary values ix and the angles θx,0 ∈ {kπ/4}7k=0
are chosen uniformly at random for each x. This is equivalent to
encrypting it with a quantum one-time pad. The result is sent to
Bob.
1.2. If ix = 1, Alice updates the measurement angles φx,0 and φx,1 to
compensate for the introduced bit flip (see Eq. (22)).
1.3. For each column y ∈ [m−1], and each row x ∈ [n], Alice prepares the
state |+θx,y〉 := 1√2 (|0〉 + eiθx,y |1〉), where the defining angle θx,y ∈
{kπ/4}7k=0 is chosen uniformly at random, and sends the qubits to
Bob.
1.4. Bob creates n qubits in the |+〉 state, which are used as the final
output layer, and entangles the qubits received from Alice and this
final layer by applying ctrl-Z operators between the pairs of qubits
specified by the pattern of the brickwork state Gn×(m+1).
2. Interaction and measurement
For y = 0, . . . ,m− 1, repeat
For x = 1, . . . , n, repeat
2.1. Alice computes the updated measurement angle φ′x,y (see Eq. (21)),
to take previous measurement outcomes received from Bob into ac-
count.
2.2. Alice chooses a binary digit rx,y ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random, and
computes δx,y = φ
′
x,y + θx,y + πrx,y.
2.3. Alice transmits δx,y to Bob, who performs a measurement in the basis
{|+δx,y 〉, |−δx,y 〉}.
2.4. Bob transmits the result sx,y ∈ {0, 1} to Alice.
2.5. If rx,y = 1, Alice flips sx,y; otherwise she does nothing.
3. Output Correction
3.1. Bob sends to Alice all qubits in the last (output) layer.
3.2. Alice performs the final Pauli corrections {ZsZx,mXsXx,m}nx=1 on the
received output qubits.
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7.1.2 One-time pad proof sketch
The basic idea behind the construction of the simulator required for the proof
of composable security of the UBQC protocol can be used in the case of a
simpler protocol— the Quantum One-Time Pad (QOTP). The QOTP ensures
confidentiality, but not authenticity, of the exchange of quantum messages over
an untrusted quantum channel.
The ideal confidentiality resource S, which we wish to construct, has three
interfaces, A (Alice, the sender), B (Bob, the receiver) and E (Eve, the eaves-
dropper). Alice inputs a message ρinA , Eve only learns the message size—though
for simplicity, we assume that the message size is fixed, and do not model it ex-
plicitly in the following— but can arbitrarily modify or replace the message.
Similarly to the blind DQC ideal resource (Definition 4.1), the eavesdropper’s
capacity to arbitrarily manipulate the message is captured by allowing some
arbitrary state ρinE and a description of a map E : L(HAE) → L(HB) to be
input at the E-interface of the ideal resource, which then outputs E(ρAE) at
the B-interface. This is depicted in Figure 9 with Eve’s functionalities grayed
to signify that they are only accessible to a cheating player.
ρoutB = E(ρ
in
AE)
Confidential channel S
ρinA ρ
out
B
E ρinE
Figure 9 – A confidential channel. Alice and Bob have access to the left and
right interface, respectively, and Eve accesses the lower interface. This channel
guarantees that Eve does not learn Alice’s input ρinA , but allows her to modify
what Bob receives. If Eve does not activate her cheating interface, the state ρinA
is output at Bob’s interface.
The resources R available to the QOTP protocol (πA, πB) are a shared secret
key and an insecure quantum channel, which simply outputs at the E-interface
anything which Alice inputs, and forwards to the B-interface anything which
Eve inputs. πA applies bit and phase flips (conditioned on the bits of the secret
key) to Alice’s input and sends the result down the insecure channel, and πB
decrypts by applying the same flips to whatever it receives. This is illustrated
in Figure 10.
To prove that this protocol constructs the ideal confidentiality resource, we
need to find a simulator σE that, when plugged into the E-interface of the ideal
resource, emulates the communication on the insecure quantum channel and
finds the appropriate inputs ρinE and E that correspond to Eve’s tampering, so
that ideal and concrete cases are indistinguishable. In other words, we need to
this variant implies the security of the classical input/output versions. Also, the quantum
one-time pad of the input states used in this protocol could be replaced with a standard
quantum one-time pad which uses only the local X and Z gates, instead of the X and the
parametrized Zθ gate, as presented here. In this case Bob would teleport the input state onto
the brickwork state built out of the pre-rotated |+θ〉 qubits, and the protocol would continue
as we have presented (but taking into account the teleportation outcomes reported by Bob).
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piA piB
key
Secret key
Insecure channel
(x, z) (x, z)
ψ ψ′
ρ ρ′
Figure 10 – The concrete setting of the QOTP, with Alice accessing the left
interface, Bob the right one and Eve the lower interface. The QOTP encrypts a
message ψ by applying bit and phase flips, ρ := ZzXxψXxZz, and decrypts by
applying the reverse operation, ψ′ := XxZzρ′ZzXx.
find a σE such that
πARπB = SσE . (23)
In the concrete setting, the distinguisher accessing πARπB can choose an
arbitrary input ρinAR, apply an arbitrary map D to the state on the quantum
channel (output at the E-interface) and its own system R, and put the result
back on the quantum channel. After decryption by πB, it ends up with the final
state ρoutBR. We depict this for one-qubit messages in Figure 11, by rearranging
Figure 10 as a circuit with the addition of the purifying system R and map D.
πA πB
Xx Zz
D
Zz Xx
ρinAR



ρ
out
BR
Figure 11 – Interaction of the distinguisher and the QOTP.
In the ideal setting, the simulator σE needs to simulate the quantum channel
and provide the ideal resource S with information allowing it to generate the
same output ρoutBR as in the concrete case. It does this by outputting half an EPR
pair (for every qubit of the message) at its outer interface, and transmitting the
other half along with any state it received at its outer interface to the ideal
resource. It also provides the ideal resource with the “instructions” E to gate
teleport the real input through the map D of the distinguisher, i.e., it teleports
the input using the EPR half, registers the possible bit and phase flips, and
outputs the second state received after having corrected the bit and phase flips
from the teleportation. Plugging this simulator into the E-interface of Figure 9
along with the distinguisher’s input ρinAE and map D, and rewriting it as a circuit
for one-qubit messages results in Figure 12.
We now show that the circuits from Figure 11 and Figure 12 are indistin-
guishable, hence Eq. (23) holds. The argument generalizes straightforwardly to
multiple qubit messages. We first rearrange Figure 12 by grouping the state
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Figure 12 – Interaction of the ideal confidentiality resource S and the simulator
σE with the distinguisher. S does not leak any information to the adversary, it
receives inputs from Alice (ρinA) and the simulator, and transmits some state to
Bob. σE—which does give information to the adversary— has no access to the
confidential message ρinA .
preparation (performed by σE) and the actual teleportation (performed by S).
This results in Figure 13.
• H z
|+〉 • x
ρinAR


|0〉
D
Zz Xx 
ρ
out
BR
Figure 13 – Reformulation of Figure 12 by grouping the simulator and the
teleportation step of the ideal confidentiality resource. The circuit in the dashed
box simply encrypts the input with a random bit and phase flip, and therefore
corresponds to πA.
The circuit in the dashed box of Figure 13 teleports the input from the first
wire to the third wire (without correcting the random flips). This is equivalent
to simply performing a random bit and phase flip on the input, which is exactly
what is done by the QOTP in Figure 11.
7.1.3 Security
In this section we prove that the UBQC protocol (Protocol 1) provides perfect
blindness, i.e., we find a simulator σB such that the two interactive boxes in
Figure 7 are indistinguishable. Similarly to the one-time pad proof sketch from
Section 7.1.2, we construct a simulator which sends only EPR pair halves and
random strings, then transmits the other halves and the transcript to the ideal
blind DQC resource. Whenever a one-time padded quantum state should have
been sent, the ideal resource teleports it using the EPR half, and uses the bit and
phase flips of the teleportation as one-time pad key. And whenever a random
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string r was sent instead of some one-time padded string s, the ideal resources
sets r ⊕ s as the random key used to encrypt and send s.
To prove that the real and ideal settings are identical, we replace steps of
the protocol by equivalent steps, until we end up with the desired simulator and
ideal resource.
Protocol 1 does not explicitly model the information that is intentionally
allowed to leak. This information consists in the size of the brickwork state
(which leaks upper bounds on the input state size and computation size), and
whether the last column of the brickwork state should be measured, i.e., whether
the output of the protocol is classical or quantum. It is simply assumed that
this information is known by the server (Bob), otherwise it could not perform
the desired computation. For simplicity we also avoid modeling this information
in the following. The protocol and proof can however be trivially changed to
include it.
Theorem 7.1. The DQC protocol described in Protocol 1 provides perfect blind-
ness.
Proof. To prove that πAR = S
blindσB , we successively modify the protocol πA,
replacing some steps with equivalent steps that implement the same map, re-
sulting in several intermediary protocols, until we achieve a version which cor-
responds to SblindσB .
The first intermediary protocol is given by Protocol 2. Compare Step 1.1
of Protocol 1 and Step 1.1 of Protocol 2. In the former, Alice picks random
values θx,0 and ix and performs corresponding phase and bit rotations on the
xth input qubit. In the latter, she performs a random θ′x,0 phase rotation, and
teleports the resulting state. For teleportation outcomes ix and rx,0, and setting
θx,0 := θ
′
x,0+πrx,0, Bob holds exactly the same state. Since the different values
of ix and θx,0 occur with the same (uniform) probabilities in both protocols,
these implement identical maps.
Likewise, compare Step 1.3 of Protocol 1 and Step 1.3 of Protocol 2. In the
former Alice sends a state |+θx,y〉 to Bob; in the latter Bob ends up holding the
state |+θ′x,y+pirx,y 〉. If Alice sets θx,0 := θ′x,0 + πrx,0 in her internal memory, all
states of the systems are identical for both protocols.
Finally, the only other difference between these protocols is in Steps 2.2 and
2.2 of the two protocols, respectively. In the former, Alice sends Bob the angle
φ′x,0 + θx,0 + πrx,0, for some randomly picked bit rx,0; in the latter, she sends
φ′x,0+θ
′
x,0. But as we’ve already established, these two angles are identical, and
occur with the same (uniform) probabilities.
Now, compare Protocol 2 and Protocol 3. The main difference is between
Step 2.2 of Protocol 2 and Step 2.2 of Protocol 3. In the former, Alice had picked
θ′x,y uniformly at random, and sends Bob δx,y, a one-time padded version of φ
′
x,y
with θ′x,y as the key; hence δx,y is uniformly distributed. In the latter protocol,
Alice instead picks δx,y uniformly at random (in Step 2.2), then computes θ
′
x,y :=
δx,y−φ′x,y (in Step 2.4) to get the value of the uniform key used to encrypt φ′x,y.
In Protocol 2, Alice used the value of θ′x,y in Steps 1.1 and 1.3. Since
θ′x,y is not available at those stages of Protocol 3, the corresponding steps are
delayed until this value is available. Hence Step 1.1 of Protocol 3 only consists
in performing the first part of the teleportation (which commutes with the Zθ′x,0
rotation) and in Step 1.3 Alice only sends half an EPR pair. In Step 2.4, after
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Protocol 2 UBQC, equivalent protocol for Alice, first version
The protocol
1. State preparation
1.1. For each x ∈ [n], Alice prepares an EPR pair (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2 and
sends half to Bob. She picks an angle θ′x,0 ∈ {kπ/4}7k=0 uniformly
at random, and applies Zθ′x,0 to the x
th qubit of the input ρin. She
then teleports the resulting qubit using her half of the EPR pair,
and registers the values of the bit and phase flips resulting from the
teleportation in ix and rx,0, respectively.
1.2. If ix = 1, Alice updates the measurement angles φx,0 and φx,1 (see
Eq. (22)).
1.3. For each column y ∈ [m − 1], and each row x ∈ [n], Alice prepares
an EPR pair (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2 and sends half to Bob. She then picks
an angle θ′x,y ∈ {kπ/4}7k=0 uniformly at random, performs a Zθ′x,y
rotation followed by a Hadamard H on her half of the pair, and
measures it in the computational basis. She stores the result in rx,y.
2. Interaction and measurement
For y = 0, . . . ,m− 1, repeat
For x = 1, . . . , n, repeat
2.1. Alice computes the updated measurement angle φ′x,y (see Eq. (21)).
2.2. Alice computes δx,y = φ
′
x,y + θ
′
x,y and transmits this to Bob.
2.3. Alice receives a bit sx,y ∈ {0, 1} from Bob.
2.4. If rx,y = 1, Alice flips sx,y; otherwise she does nothing.
3. Output Correction
3.1. Alice receives n qubits from Bob, and performs the final Pauli cor-
rections {ZsZx,mXsXx,m}nx=1 on these qubits.
computing θ′x,y, Alice completes those two steps by performing the missing
operations.
Protocol 4 consists in exactly the same steps as Protocol 3, but their order
has been rearranged, and the different parts have been renamed “simulator”
and “ideal resource”. The ideal blind DQC resource constructed meets the
requirements of Definition 4.1, we have πAR = S
blindσB and conclude the proof.
7.2 One-way communication
If a protocol only requires one-way communication from Bob to Alice, the pro-
tocol model described in Section 4.1.2 can be simplified: it only consists in two
operations. Bob generates a state τ , which he sends to Alice on the channel C.
She then applies some operation E : L(HAC)→ L(HA) to her input and τ , and
outputs the contents of her system A.
Theorem 7.2. Any DQC protocol π with one-way communication from Bob to
Alice provides perfect blindness.
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Protocol 3 UBQC, equivalent protocol for Alice, second version
The protocol
1. State preparation
1.1. For each x ∈ [n], Alice prepares an EPR pair (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2 and
sends half to Bob. She performs the first measurement of a teleporta-
tion that determines the bit flip, i.e., for each x she performs a CNOT
on the corresponding EPR half using the input qubit as control, and
measures the EPR half in the computational basis. She records the
outcome in ix.
1.2. If ix = 1, Alice updates the measurement angles φx,0 and φx,1 (see
Eq. (22)).
1.3. For each column y ∈ [m − 1], and each row x ∈ [n], Alice prepares
an EPR pair (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2 and sends half to Bob.
2. Interaction and measurement
For y = 0, . . . ,m− 1, repeat
For x = 1, . . . , n, repeat
2.1. Alice computes the updated measurement angle φ′x,y (see Eq. (21)).
2.2. Alice picks an angle δx,y ∈ {kπ/4}7k=0 uniformly at random, and
sends it to Bob.
2.3. Alice receives a bit sx,y ∈ {0, 1} from Bob.
2.4. Alice computes θ′x,y = δx,y − φ′x,y. She then applies Zθ′x,y , followed
by a Hadamard H and a measurement in the computational basis to
the xth qubit of the input ρin if y = 0, and to the corresponding EPR
half if y > 0. She stores the result in rx,y.
2.5. If rx,y = 1, Alice flips sx,y; otherwise she does nothing.
3. Output Correction
3.1. Alice receives n qubits from Bob, and performs the final Pauli cor-
rections {ZsZx,mXsXx,m}nx=1 on these qubits.
Proof. The simulator σB works as follows. It receives some state ψC from the
distinguisher, and provides it to the ideal resource Sblind along with a descrip-
tion of the map E that is used by πA. Alice’s output is thus E(ψAC), and we
immediately have d(πAR,SσB) = 0.
This proof does not mention the permitted leaks at the B-interface. This is
because protocols with one-way communication make the (implicit) assumption
that this information is known to the server. Alternatively, one could include
a single message from Alice to Bob containing this information, and adapt the
proof above accordingly.
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Protocol 4 UBQC, simulator and ideal resource
The simulator
1. For each column y ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, and each row x ∈ [n], the simula-
tor prepares an EPR pair (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2 and outputs half at its outer
interface.
2. For each column y ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}, and each row x ∈ [n], the simulator
picks an angle δx,y ∈ {kπ/4}7k=0 uniformly at random, and outputs it at
its outer interface. It receives some response sx,y ∈ {0, 1}.
3. The simulator receives n qubits, which correspond to the last (output)
layer.
4. The simulator transmits all EPR pair half, all angles δx,y, bits sx,y and
output qubits to the ideal blind delegated quantum computation resource,
along with instructions to perform the operations described hereafter.
The ideal blind DQC resource
1. The blind DQC resource receives the input ρin and a description of the
computation given by angles φx,y at its A-interface, and all the information
described in Step 4 above at its B-interface.
2. For each x ∈ [n], it performs the first measurement of a teleportation of
the input, i.e., for each x it performs a CNOT on the corresponding EPR
half using the input qubit as control, and measures the EPR half in the
computational basis. It records the outcome in ix.
3. If ix = 1, it updates the measurement angles φx,0 and φx,1 (see Eq. (22)).
4. For y = 0, . . . ,m− 1, repeat
For x = 1, . . . , n, repeat
4.1. It computes the updated measurement angle φ′x,y (see Eq. (21)).
4.2. It computes θ′x,y = δx,y − φ′x,y. It then applies Zθ′x,y , followed by a
Hadamard H and a measurement in the computational basis to the
xth qubit of the input ρin if y = 0, and to the corresponding EPR
half if y > 0. It stores the result in rx,y.
4.3. If rx,y = 1, it flips sx,y; otherwise it does nothing.
5. The ideal blind DQC resource performs the final Pauli corrections
{ZsZx,mXsXx,m}nx=1 on the received output qubits, and outputs the result at
its A-interface.
37
Appendices
A Distance measures for subnormalized states
In Section 3.3 we introduced the trace distance D(ρ, σ) between two quantum
states. Another widely used measure is the fidelity, defined as
F (ρ, σ) := tr
(√
ρ1/2σρ1/2
)
.
When dealing with subnormalized states, we need to generalize these mea-
sures to retain their properties. The following distance notions are treated in
detail in [TCR10], and we refer to that work for more information.
For any two subnormalized states ρ, σ ∈ S≤(H), we define the generalized
trace distance as
D¯(ρ, σ) := D(ρ, σ) +
1
2
| tr ρ− trσ|,
and the generalized fidelity as
F¯ (ρ, σ) := F (ρ, σ) +
√
(1− tr ρ)(1− tr σ).
The (generalized) fidelity has a useful property, known as Uhlmann’s theo-
rem (see [NC00] or Lemma A.2 here below), which states that for any two states
ρ, σ, there exist purifications of these states which have the same fidelity. We
define a metric, the purified distance, based on the fidelity, so as to retain this
property:
P (ρ, σ) :=
√
1− F¯ 2(ρ, σ).
This metric coincides with the generalized distance for pure states, and is
larger otherwise.
Lemma A.1 (See [TCR10, Lemma 6]). Let ρ, σ ∈ S≤(H). Then
D¯(ρ, σ) ≤ P (ρ, σ) ≤
√
2D¯(ρ, σ).
Uhlmann’s theorem restated for the purified distance is as follows.
Lemma A.2 (See [TCR10, Lemma 8]). Let ρ, σ ∈ S≤(HA) and ϕ ∈ S≤(HAR)
be a purification of ρ. Then there exists a purification ψ ∈ S≤(HAR) of σ such
that P (ρ, σ) = P (ϕ, ψ).
B Correctness
Intuitively, a protocol is correct if, when Bob behaves honestly, Alice ends up
with the correct output. This must also hold with respect to a purification of
the input.
Definition B.1. A DQC protocol provides ε-local-correctness, if, when both
parties behave honestly, for all initial states ψAR, the map implemented by the
protocol on Alice’s input, PA : L(HA)→ L(HA) is
PA ≈ε U . (24)
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It is straightforward, that this is equivalent to the composable notion defined
in Eqs. (4) and (5) in Section 4.2.
Lemma B.2. A DQC protocol which provides ε-local-correctness is also ε-cor-
rect.
Proof. The resources πARπB and S⊥B have only one input and output, both on
the A-interface, they are therefore maps L(HA) → L(HA). In fact, πARπB =
PA and S⊥B = U . So from Definition B.1, πARπB ≈ε S⊥B.
C Applying the reduction
The definitions of local-blindness and local-verifiability used in this work are
equivalent to those used to prove local-security for most protocols in the liter-
ature, e.g., by Fitzsimons and Kashefi [FK12] and Morimae [Mor14]. To prove
that such protocols are secure, it remains to show that they satisfy the stronger
definition of independent local-verifiability introduced in this work. We sketch
in this section that this is the case for [FK12] and [Mor14], and leave it open to
prove this formally.
C.1 DQC protocol of Fitzsimons and Kashefi
Fitzsimons and Kashefi [FK12] extend the DQC protocol of [BFK09] to include a
new approach which allows for verifiability as well. They do this by suggesting a
novel resource-state for measurement-based quantum computing, the geometry
of which allows the random positioning of trap qubits (the number of which
can be a fraction of the overall computation size). To achieve this, Alice is
additionally empowered to produce the Z observable eigenstates |0〉, |1〉 along
with the 8 symmetric states from the XY plane of the Bloch sphere. They
prove that if the measurement results of these trap qubits are not what the
client Alice expects, she knows that the server is cheating, and if no traps are
triggered, Alice can be sure (up to some error ε) that the server is running the
correct protocol.
Lemma C.1. If the protocol of [FK12] is run with parameters such that it has
error ε, then it is 4
√
2ε1/4N2-blind-verifiable, where N is the dimension of the
subsystem of Alice’s which is quantum.
Proof sketch. The protocol of [FK12] is an extension of the UBQC protocol
of [BFK09] analyzed in Section 7.1, and also provides perfect blindness.
The verifiability definition used in [FK12] is expressed differently from that
of Definition 6.2. For a pure input |ψAR〉, the correct output is |UψAR〉 :=
U ⊗ idR |ψAR〉. The projector
Π := idAR−|UψAR〉〈UψAR| − |err〉〈err| ⊗ idR
defines the space where an erroneous output is accepted, and the verifiability
criterion of [FK12] can be reduced to
tr(ΠρAR) ≤ ε, (25)
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where ρAR is the state of Alice and the reference system at the end of the
protocol. Note that the output can always be written as a linear combination
of the error flag and some accepted output,
ρAR = pσAR + (1− p)|err〉〈err| ⊗ ψR.
Plugging this in the two definitions of local-verifiability we find that Definition 6.2
is equivalent to requiring pD(σAR, |UψAR〉) ≤ ε and Eq. (25) is equivalent to
having p(1−F 2(σAR, |UψAR〉) ≤ ε, whereD(·, ·) is the trace distance (Section 3.3)
and F (·, ·) is the fidelity (Appendix A). Using standard bounds between the
trace distance and fidelity, we find that any protocol which respects Eq. (25) for
all pure AR inputs provides
√
ε-local-verifiability.
To prove that the protocol satisfies perfectly independent
√
ε-local-verifiabil-
ity, consider the proof technique for the security of the UBQC protocol [BFK09]
analyzed in Section 7.1. There, we showed that instead of running the correct
protocol with Bob, Alice could equivalently run it using EPR pairs instead of
her quantum input. And once the interaction with Bob is over, she finishes
the computation locally by gate teleporting her input through Bob’s operations
and obtains the same final output. Since the protocol of [FK12] is an extension
of the UBQC protocol of [BFK09], the same technique can be applied. How-
ever instead of gate teleporting the input, we are interested here in measuring
the trap qubits (and ignore the other EPR pairs that could be used for the
gate teleportation and computation of the final output). By doing this, Alice
can determine if Bob is cheating, without needing to have any input, and the
verification mechanism is thus clearly independent of the input. To formally
prove that it provides perfect independence, we need to find alternative maps
that Bob can apply, and which result in him holding ρA¯B, the joint system of
Alice’s decision to accept or reject his input, A¯, and his side information, B (see
Remark 6.4). This can be done by disregarding the communication with Alice,
and running this alternative protocol with EPR pairs on his own.
Putting this together with the fact that [FK12] satisfies the local-correctness
condition and Corollary 6.9 concludes this proof.
C.2 DQC protocol of Morimae
Morimae [Mor14] generalizes the protocol of [MF13] with one-way communica-
tion from Bob to Alice (in which Alice measures the individual qubits of the
resource state sent to her by the sever Bob) to include a notion of verifiability.
In a first step, Alice runs the same protocol as [MF13], but instead of computing
the task received as input, she runs an alternative computation that generates
in the last layer a new resource state with randomly positioned trap qubits. In a
second step, Alice measures the individual qubits of this new resource, but this
time with the goal of running the computation provided as input. If no traps
are triggered, she can be sure (up to some error ε), that the server is behaving
honestly and her outcome is correct.
Morimae discusses the local-blindness and local-verifiability of this protocol.
Given these two properties, we only need to show that this protocol is inde-
pendent local-verifiable for our Corollary 6.9 to be applicable. The argument is
similar to the proof sketch of Lemma C.1: Alice does not need to know the input
to measure the trap qubits and decide if Bob is cheating. Thus, Bob could run
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the protocol on his own—without knowing Alice’s input and choosing himself
the position of the trap qubits—measuring only the trap qubits in the last layer,
not those used for computation. At the end of which, he would hold exactly the
same bit as Alice that decides if the output is accepted or rejected.
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